The distributional consequences of tax reforms under market distortions by Angelopoulos, Konstantinos et al.
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2011-73
The distributional consequences of tax
reforms under market distortions
Konstantinos Angelopoulos
Wei Jiang
James R. Malley 
University of Glasgow
www.sire.ac.uk
The distributional consequences of tax
reforms under market distortions
Konstantinos Angelopoulos, Wei Jiang,
James R. Malley
University of Glasgow
September 17, 2011
Abstract
In this paper we examine the importance of imperfect competition
in product and labour markets in determining the long-run welfare
e¤ects of tax reforms assuming agent heterogeneneity in capital hold-
ings. Each of these market failures, independently, results in welfare
losses for at least a segment of the population, after a capital tax cut
and a concurrent labour tax increase. However, when combined in a
realistic calibration to the UK economy, they imply that a capital tax
cut will be Pareto improving in the long run. Consistent with the the-
ory of second-best, the two distortions in this context work to correct
the negative distributional e¤ects of a capital tax cut that each one,
on its own, creates.
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1 Introduction
The seminal research of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) established that the
optimal tax policy under commitment is to set a zero tax rate on capital in
the long-run, while, concurrently, increasing labour taxes to the level required
to nance public spending.1 A striking implication of this result is that
despite the higher tax burden for those agents not holding capital, optimal
tax policy is Pareto improving in the long-run. The intuition is that the gains
from increased labour productivity, induced by higher capital accumulation,
compensate for the costs of higher labour taxes and hence labour income is
increased.2
Another strand in the literature has focused on the distributional e¤ects
of tax reforms in models where the optimal long-run zero capital tax may or
may not obtain (see e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) for a review of this liter-
ature). For instance, Domeij and Heathcote (2004) show that there can be
distributional e¤ects from cutting capital taxes in the presence of uninsured
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) nd that there
will be lifetime welfare losses for labour from a tax reform that implements
the zero capital tax. This is because the benets to labour, through the high
capital and productivity channel, occur in the long-run, whereas the costs, in
the form of higher labour taxes, have an immediate e¤ect. Also Angelopou-
los et al. (2011b) show that if capital complements skilled labour more than
unskilled, capital tax cuts can be skill-biased and thus hurt unskilled labour.
With a view to contributing to the tax policy literature focussed on dis-
tributional issues, we study the importance of unionised labour markets and
monopolistically competitive product markets in determining the long-run
e¤ects of tax reforms that re-allocate the tax burden from capital to labour.
In this set up the government taxes capital income, including interest on
savings and prots, and labour income by using two di¤erent tax rates. In
the unionised labour market, the wage rate is determined, following e.g.
Nickell and Andrews (1983), Farber (1986), Pissarides (1998) and Kass and
von Thadden (2004), as the outcome of a Nash-bargain between unions and
1A signicant body of literature has examined the conditions under which an optimal
non-zero capital tax might be obtained in the long-run. For example Guo and Lansing
(1999) and Domeij (2005) introduce product and labour market power respectively into
representative agent models assuming governments have access to a commitment technol-
ogy. Also see Klein et al. (2008) who, in contrast, use a representative agent framework
without market frictions assuming time-consistent Markov policies.
2Note that a non-zero optimal capital tax can be obtained in models with heterogeneous
agents, under skill di¤erences (see e.g. Conesa et al. (2009)) or lack of commitment
mechanisms on the part of the government (see e.g. Krusell (2002) and Angelopoulos et
al. (2011a)).
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rms. Also, given the importance of the unemployment benet as the out-
side option in the Nash-bargaining process, we include it as a component of
government spending along with non-employment related public transfers.
In the monopolistically competitive product market, following e.g. Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Guo and Lansing (1999),
intermediate goods producers earn non-zero economic prots. To highlight
the importance of union bargaining and rm power in the product market
relative to the competitive model of Judd (1985) we assume a standard neo-
classical production technology without skill heterogeneity. Therefore, agents
are distinguished in this setup by di¤erences in their capital holdings.
To understand the quantitative implications of distortions in the labour
and product markets when assessing the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms, we
calibrate the model so that its steady-state reproduces the main features of
the current UK economy and, in particular, its tax structure and long-run
unemployment rate. The UK is used to illustrate the quantitative analy-
sis since unions play an important role in wage-bargaining at the rm-level
compared to other EU economies3 and because its tax structure stands in
stark contrast with other European countries, by having a very high capital
to labour income tax ratio.4
Since the e¤ects of tax reforms that reduce the capital tax are monotonic
in our setup, we focus on implementing a reform that is consistent with the
"zero capital tax" prescription from the optimal taxation literature.5 Tax
reforms have recently received a great deal of attention by both academics
and policymakers (see e.g. the discussion in Garcia-Milà et. al. (2010) for
OECD countries and the Mirrlees Review, Mirrlees et. al. (2010, 2011) for
the UK). However, to the best of our knowledge, the potential distributional
e¤ects of such reforms have not been examined under imperfect competition
in both product and labour markets. Given the relevance of these market
failures, which the scal authorities must largely take as given institutional
features when designing tax reforms, our analysis aims to inform current
policy discussions in the UK and other advanced economies.
3For example, see the OECD Employment Outlook 2004 which distinguishes levels of
bargaining in terms of where labour contracts are negotiated for the period 1970-2000.
The data show that wage bargaining in the UK mainly occurs at the rm-level since
1980. The evidence also suggests that there is little or no coordination by upper-level
associations. In contrast, in many other European countries, e.g. Belgium, Germany and
Spain, bargaining takes place at the industry-level.
4See e.g. Martinez-Mongay (2000) for e¤ective tax rates in European countries. More
details on tax and other data used for the calibration are provided later in section 3.
5See, however, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for a discussion of Ramsey taxation in
models with distortions and Hagedorn (2010) on how labour market distortions can result
in non-convexities in the Ramsey problem.
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Our over-arching nding is that the presence of labour and product mar-
ket distortions is critical in determining not only the size but also the direc-
tion of welfare e¤ects after the capital tax cut and, in particular, whether a
capital tax cut can be Pareto improving. Previous research suggests that, on
their own, each of these failures should result in welfare losses for at least a
segment of the population, after a capital tax cut and a concurrent labour
tax increase. For instance, Ardagna (2007) employs a model with monopoly
union power and documents negative welfare e¤ects for workers after in-
creases in labour taxes, while Guo and Lansing (1999) show that the optimal
capital tax in a model with monopolistic competition in the product market
can be non-zero. While these implications are conrmed in our model, we
also nd that when both failures characterise the economy, one distortion
e¤ectively corrects the other in a way that a capital tax cut can be Pareto
improving.
Our specic results can be summarised as follows. First, in the model
with only the labour market distortion, a tax reform that implements a zero
capital tax will imply welfare losses for the workers in the long-run, whereas
capitalists and aggregate welfare increase. As in the model with perfectly
competitive labour and product markets, when the capital tax is set to zero,
the labour tax will have to increase to make up for the loss in tax revenue.
However, given the non-competitive labour market, this increase in labour
taxes will lead to a rise in unemployment, because it lowers the returns to
work and thus makes the outside option, in the form of unemployment bene-
ts, more attractive to the union. The unemployment channel is the critical
link that modies the results from the benchmark model with competitive
labour markets.6 In particular, although labour productivity and the wage
rate increase in the long-run, thanks to the higher capital accumulation, the
workers cannot capture the full benet of this as unemployment has also in-
creased and the return to unemployment, i.e. the unemployment benet, is
less than the wage rate.
Second, under competitive labour markets but non-competitive product
markets, there are welfare gains for the capitalists, losses for the workers, and
also losses at the aggregate level, by a reform that implements a zero tax on
capital income. This happens because, in this case, the government foregoes
revenue from a non-distortionary tax base comprised of "pure prots" so that
the required increase in the labour tax is larger and thus the after-tax wage
decreases after the tax reform.
6We conrm the quantitative importance of the unemployment channel by contrasting
the above results to those obtained by performing the same experiment in the model with
perfectly competitive labour markets, also calibrated to the same tax structure for the UK
economy. In this case there are welfare gains for all agents.
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Finally, monopolistic competition in the product market under unionised
labour markets, introduces a market failure that works to correct the neg-
ative implications of imperfect labour markets. In particular, monopolistic
competition tends to reduce the positive revenue e¤ects of the increase in
output after a capital tax cut and thus reduces the benets to the rm for
a successful outcome of wage bargaining. In turn, this implies that the rel-
ative attractiveness of the rms outside option in bargaining and its power
relative to the union increases. This tends to increase employment and the
benets to all agents after a tax cut.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model
structure and Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model to the current
UK economy. The results are analysed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We next describe a model economy that allows for imperfect competition in
both labour and product markets. The economy consists of innitely lived
households, rms, trade unions, and a government. Households are com-
prised of capitalists and workers. Capitalists can work and save in the form
of capital, own rms and receive prots. Workers, in contrast, do not save
and thus consume all their disposable income in each period. Both capital-
ists and workers can spend part of their time endowment either employed or
unemployed and receive unemployment benets from the government when
not working. All households are represented by rm-level trade unions which
determine work hours and bargain with rms over the wage rate with the
aim of maximising the average labour income of their members. Firms in-
clude nal and intermediate goods producers. Final goods producers are
competitive, but intermediate goods producers have monopoly power in the
product market and seek to maximise prots employing workers from the
unionised labour market and capital from the perfectly competitive asset
market. Finally, exogenous public policy consists of the government taxing
interest income from capital, prots and labour income to nance unemploy-
ment benets and other non-employment related public transfers.
The timing of events in this setup is as follows. Given scal policy, unions
and intermediate goods producers bargain over the wage rate, subject to the
demand functions for labour and intermediate goods, by taking capital ac-
cumulation as given. Next, each intermediate goods producer, taking factor
prices, nal output and government policy as given, chooses factor quanti-
ties to maximise prots, subject to the demand function by the nal goods
producer for its output. Finally, nal goods producers generate output and
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households make their savings decisions, taking all prices and policy variables
as given.
2.1 Population composition
Total population, N , is exogenous and constant over time with capitalists
and workers respectively being denoted as Nk and Nw. We also dene the
population share of capitalists as: Nk=N  nk, and the workers share as
Nw=N  nw = 1   nk. Finally we assume that each capitalist owns one
intermediate goods-producing rm, hence the number of rms, N f = Nk.
2.2 Households
Each household i = k; w, maximises the discounted sum of lifetime utility:
1X
t=0
t
(Cit)
1 
1   (1)
where Cit is household is private consumption; 0 <  < 1 is the constant
rate of time preference; and  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The budget constraint of each capitalist at t is given by:
Ckt + I
k
t = rtK
k
t    kt (rt   )Kkt + (1   kt )kt + (2)
+ (1  wt )wtet +G
u
t (1  et) +G
t
t
where Ikt is investment; K
k
t is the capital stock held at the beginning of time
t; rt is the gross return to capital; kt is prots; et = 1  ut is the per capita
employment rate with ut denoting the per capita unemployment rate; wt
is the gross wage rate; G
u
t is per capita unemployment benets; G
t
t is per
capita government transfers; 0  wt < 1 is the tax rate on labour income;
0   kt < 1 is the tax rate on capital income; and 0 <  < 1 is the constant
depreciation rate of capital stock.7
The capital stock evolves according to:
Kkt+1 = (1  )Kkt + Ikt (3)
7Note that we assume capital taxes net of depreciation as in e.g. Lansing (1998). Also,
we assume, as in e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999), that the scal authority cannot impose a
separate tax rate on prots and on interest income from savings, since it is di¢ cult, in
practice, to distinguish these two sources of capital income. If a separate prot tax was
available, welfare could be improved by using this tax instrument, relative to the others,
given that taxing prots does not distort incentives.
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and each workers within period budget constraint is:
Cwt = (1  wt )wtet +G
u
t (1  et) +G
t
t: (4)
Each household is randomly allocated to a union which bargains with a
rm to determine employment, et, and the wage rate, wt. Given that we will
work with a symmetric equilibrium, employment and the wage rate will be
the same for all households, so that the allocation of households to unions
does not matter. In other words, we do not examine hetererogeneity in the
labour market. Instead, all heterogeneity in our model is driven by di¤erences
in asset ownership.8
Therefore, the capitalists problem is to choose

Ckt ; K
k
t+1
	1
t=0
to maxi-
mize (1) subject to (2) and (3) taking market prices frt; wtg1t=0, the employ-
ment rate fetg1t=0, policy variables
n
 kt ; 
w
t ; G
u
t ;G
t
t
o1
t=0
, and Kk0 as given. The
work hours for capitalists and the wage rate are determined by the bargain
between the union and rm. Since the worker does not save and given that
his work hours also depend on the outcome of the Nash bargain, optimal
consumption simply follows residually from his budget constraint in (4).
2.3 Firms
We follow e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999) in allowing for monopolistic power in
the intermediate goods market. A unique nal good Yt is produced according
to the following constant returns to scale technology:
Yt =
24 NfX
f=1
f

Y ft
351= (5)
where
NfX
f=1
f = 1 are weights attached to intermediate goods producers; and
0 <   1 implies the degree of monopoly power of intermediate goods pro-
ducers. Final goods producers behave competitively and choose intermediate
inputs, Y ft , to maximize prots, t, taking the price of these inputs, P
f
t , as
given:
t = Yt  
NfX
f=1
fP ft Y
f
t . (6)
8To simplify notation, we do not use household subscripts for et and wt, since these
quantities will be the same for capitalists and workers in equilibrium. Thus, et and wt,
like G
u
t and G
t
t, denote average, or per capita outcomes.
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Each intermediate rm produces its output, Y ft , with a constant-returns-
to-scale technology in two productive inputs: capital, Kft , and workers, L
f
t :
Y ft = A

Kft
 
Lft
1 
(7)
where A is neutral technical progress and 0 <  < 1 denotes capitals share
of output. Hence, the prots earned by the intermediate goods producer at
time t are:
ft = P
f
t Y
f
t   rtKft   wft Lft . (8)
Taking factor prices, rt and w
f
t , and nal output, Yt, as given, the intermedi-
ate rm chooses Kft and L
f
t to maximize prots (8) subject to its production
function (7) and the demand function for its output, P ft =

Yt=Y
f
t
1 
, given
by the optimality condition of the nal goods producer, @t=@Y
f
t = 0. When
 = 1, intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in the production of the
nal good implying that intermediate goods producers have no power in the
product market. In this case, prices are given for these producers and thus
there is perfect competition. However, when  < 1, the demand function is
downward slopping and they can exploit their monopoly power to maximise
non-zero prots.
2.4 Unions
Following the literature cited in the introduction, we employ the right-to-
manage setup where unions and rms (intermediate goods producer) bargain
over the wage rate. For simplicity, we assume that each union bargains with
one rm to determine the wage rate (see e.g. Pissarides (1998)). Given that
we will work with a symmetric equilibrium, this assumption is not important.
Moreover, for tractability, and following e.g. Domeij (2005) and Koskela and
von Thadden (2008), we make two simplifying assumptions regarding this
bargaining process.9 First, we assume that unions are small enough so that
they do not internalise the e¤ects of the wage rate on capital accumulation
and thus on future prices. Second, we assume that rms are also small enough
so that they do not internalise the e¤ects of the outcome of wage bargaining
on capital accumulation.
The above assumptions imply that unions and rms take capital as given
when bargaining over the wage rate. This form of myopia allows for a techni-
cal simplication in that it e¤ectively reduces the wage-bargaining problem
9See e.g. Domeij (2005), Koskela and von Thadden (2008) and the references therein
for the empirical relevance of these assumptions.
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to a series of static problems, as in e.g. Pissarides (1998). The union and
the intermediate goods producer bargain over the wage rate to maximise a
weighted average of labour income and prots:
UNt =
h
(1  wt )wtnkLft +G
u
t

1  nkLft

 Gut
i h
ft + rtK
f
t
i1 
(9)
subject to the labour demand function given by the rms rst-order con-
dition for labour, @ft =@L
f
t = 0; and the rms product demand function,
P ft =

Yt=Y
f
t
1 
, taking the capital stock, Kft , nal output, Yt, and the
scal policy variables,
n
 kt ; 
w
t ; G
u
t ; G
t
t
o
, as given.
In the above setup, nkLft  et is the average employment rate, so that
1  nkLft

is the unemployment rate and 0    1 describes the relative
bargaining power of the union with  = 1 representing the monopoly union
case. Note that the union targets average labour income, (1  wt )wtnkLft +
+G
u
t

1  nkLft

, while the rm targets average prots, ft . The outside op-
tion for the union is the unemployment benet, G
u
t , while for the rm it is
the sunk cost of capital,  rtKft , which is a consequence of the assumption
that the representative rm takes the average capital accumulation as given.
It is important to note that while the agents involved in Nash-bargaining
over the wage rate do not internalise the e¤ects of the wage rate on capi-
tal accumulation, consistent with e.g. Domeij (2005) and Koskela and von
Thadden (2008), they do internalise the e¤ects of the wage rate on prots,
via the monopolistic demand schedule.
2.5 Government and market clearing conditions
The per-capita government budget constraint equating public spending and
revenues is given by:
G
t
t +G
u
t (1  et) = nk kt (rt   )Kkt + nk kt kt + wt wtet: (10)
To ensure that the government budget is balanced at each time t, we allow
the wage income tax wt to be residually determined. In what follows, we will
assume that the government spending instruments are xed to their steady-
state values G
t
and G
u
, respectively, so that any changes in the capital tax
rate,  kt , will be met by changes in 
w
t , ensuring that the budget constraint
of the government is satised.
The capital market clears when the supply is equal to the demand for
capital per capita:
Kkt = K
f
t : (11)
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The market clearing condition for per capita dividends is:
kt = 
f
t : (12)
In the labour market the equality of per capita labour supply and demand
is given by:
et = n
kLft : (13)
Finally, in the goods market, the economys per capita resource constraint
is:
nkY ft = n
kCkt + n
wCwt + n
k

Kkt+1   (1  )Kkt

: (14)
2.6 Decentralized equilibrium
We summarize the decentralized equilibrium conditions in real terms and as a
symmetric equilibrium implying that Y ft = Yt, w
f
t = wt and P
f
t = 1 for all f .
Given the paths of prices fwt; rtg1t=0 the policy instruments
n
 kt ; G
u
t ; G
t
t
o1
t=0
and an initial condition forKk0 , a decentralized equilibrium (DE) is dened to
be an allocation

Ckt ; K
k
t+1; C
w
t ; et
	1
t=0
and one residually determined policy
instrument, wt , such that (i) households, rms and unions undertake their
respective optimization problems outlined above; (ii) all budget constraints
are satised; and (iii) all markets clear.
To summarize, the DE consists of the capitalists optimality conditions
for Ckt and K
k
t+1; the rms rst-order conditions for K
f
t and L
f
t ; the budget
constraints of workers and government, i.e. BCw and BCg; the aggregate
resource constraint, RC; the market clearing conditions in the capital, divi-
dend and labour markets, i.e. MCK , MC andMCL; the unions optimality
condition for the wage rate, wt, and constraint for the employment rate, et:10
Ckt : 
k
t =   1Ckt
Kkt+1 : 
k
t = 
k
t+1

rt+1    +  kt+1 (   rt+1) + 1

Kft : rt = 
Y ft
Kft
Lft : wt =  (1  ) Y
f
t
Lft
BCw : Cwt = (1  wt )wtet +G
u
t (1  et) +G
t
t
BCg : G
t
t +G
u
t (1  et) = nk kt (rt   )Kkt + nk kt kt + wt wtet
RC : nkY ft = n
kCkt + n
wCwt + n
k

Kkt+1   (1  )Kkt

(15)
10Note that relying on Walrass law, we drop the budget constraint of the capitalist from
the DE.
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MCK : K
k
t = K
f
t
MC : 
k
t = 
f
t
MCL : et = n
kLft
wt : 
u
t =
et( 1)[ et
t]
nk
h
(nk)
1 
Y ft  wtLft
i   et[	 (wt   1) [ et
t]( 1)
et : 
u
t

( 1)A(Kkt )

nk(Lft )
+1

+
(2 2)( 1)( 1)A(Kkt )

(Lft )
  1
nk
=
=
( 2)( 1)( 1)A(Kkt )

(Lft )
  1
nk
+ 	(1 )
t [ et
t]( 1) 
  (  1)

wt
nk
+
( 1)(nk) A(Kkt )

(Lft )
 +
( 1)( 1)A(Kkt )

(Lft )
 
(nk)


[ et
t]
	
where kt and 
u
t refer to the Lagrangian multipliers from the capitalists and
unions problems respectively; Y ft = A

Kft
 
Lft
1 
; kt = (1   )Y ft ;
	   nk1  Y ft   wtLft ; and 
t  Gut + wt (wt   1).
3 Calibration to the UK economy
We next calibrate the structural parameters of the model with product and
labour market distortions so that its steady-state solution reects the main
empirical characteristics of the UK economy, with particular emphasis on the
tax rates and the unemployment rate. The structural parameters for the full
model, including both labour and product market distortions, are reported
in Table 1 with the implied steady-state solution in Table 2 column (1).
According to the Family Resources Survey in 2008-2009, about 30% of
households have savings and investments above £ 10,000.11 Assuming, for the
households with savings below this threshold, that capital income does not
constitute a signicant portion of their budget, we set the share of capitalists,
nk, to 0:3. We normalise the productivity parameter, A; to 1. We also use
common values from the literature for the: (i) intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, 1= = 0:5 or  = 2; (ii) depreciation rate,  = 0:1; and (iii)
annual rate of time preference,  = 0:97, (see, e.g. Angelopoulos et al.
(2011b) and references therein). Together with a standard value for the
capital productivity parameter,  = 0:35, these parameters imply that in
the steady-state the capital-to-output ratio is about 2.
We choose a value for union power,  = 0:5, which is in the middle of
the range (i.e. 0:4 to 0:6) of values typically used in the literature (see e.g.
11The survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see their Table 4.9
in Chapter 4: Savings and Investments of the 2008-2009 Annual Report for the information
reported here).
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Domeij (2005) for a discussion of the relevant studies and empirical evidence).
We show later that the results which follow in the remainder of the paper
remain qualitatively robust to lower and higher values of  encompassing this
range.
The base calibration also allows for market power in the product market
by setting  = 0:9, implying that prots, in equilibrium, amount to 10%
of GDP. This value approximates the magnitude typically employed in New
Keynesian models to capture the price mark-up over marginal costs (see, e.g.
Leith and Malley (2005)). As with union power, we show below that the
results which follow, generally, do not change qualitatively when di¤erent
values of  are considered.
E¤ective average tax rates for capital and labour income from 1970-2005
are constructed by following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007) using data
from the National Accounts and the Public Sector, Taxation and Market
Regulation databases (available from OECD.Stat database). The average
capital tax rate over the time period is  k = 0:442. This dataset also implies
that the average labour income rate is 0:27.12 We thus calibrate the spending
instruments, G
t
and G
u
, so that the implied model solution for w is 0:27 and
the unemployment rate is 7%. The unemployment rate corresponds to the
average from 1970 to 2010 from the UK O¢ ce for National Statistics.
Table 1: Calibration (labour and product market distortions)
Parameter Denition Value
0    1 rate of time preference 0.970
0    1 capitals share 0.350
0    1 depreciation rate on capital 0.100
0  nk  1 population share of capitalists 0.300
  1 relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 2.000
A TFP level 1.000
0    1 union power 0.500
0    1 product market power 0.900
G
t  0 per capita public transfers 0.309
G
u  0 per capita unemployment benet 0.475
0   k  1 tax rate on capital income 0.442
12According to the ECFIN tax rates (see Martinez-Mongay, 2000) the UK implicit tax
rate on labour is 26.5% compared to 37.5% in the EU-11. In contrast, the implicit tax
rate on capital of 47% in the UK is well above the rate of 30% in the EU-11 and indeed is
one of the highest in the EU. Following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007) gives similar
qualitative tax rates for the UK and has the advantage that we can use data for a longer
period.
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The steady-state solution for the above parameterisation, as shown in
Table 2 column (1), implies the following shares of public spending in GDP:
Gt
Y
= 0:227 and G
u
Y
= 0:024, which further implies that government spend-
ing in transfers is about 25% of GDP, consistent with UK data from the
OECD.Stat database. In addition, it suggests a replacement ratio, G
u
w
, of
about 50% in the long-run. This rate is comparable with data for industri-
alised countries (see e.g. Nickell and Nunziata (2001)) and values used in
previous studies, ranging from 45% (Shi and Wen (1999)) to 60% (Pissarides
(1998)). We also report, in Table 2, the net returns to labour and capital,ew = w(1 w) and er = (r   )  1   k, respectively, which will be useful for
the analysis which follows. Finally aggregate or social welfare, U , is dened
in the Benthamite fashion as the average welfare of all agents in the economy.
Table 2: Pre-reform steady-states
Full Comp. Union Prots
Model Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C
Y
0.797 0.775 0.775 0.797
Ik
Y
0.203 0.225 0.225 0.203
Kk
Y
2.027 2.252 2.252 2.027
Gt
Y
0.227 0.231 0.203 0.252
Gu
Y
0.024 0.000 0.028 0.000

Y
0.100 0.000 0.000 0.100
G
u
w
0.499 0.000 0.575 0.000
w 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270
(1  e) 0.070 0.000 0.070 0.000
w 0.951 1.006 1.006 0.856ew 0.694 0.735 0.735 0.625
r 0.173 0.155 0.155 0.155er 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.031
Ck 1.461 1.451 1.350 1.571
Cw 0.924 1.092 1.015 0.993
Uk -22.82 -22.97 -24.70 -21.22
Uw -36.09 -30.53 -32.83 -33.57
U -32.11 -28.26 -30.39 -29.86
To obtain benchmarks that will help contextualise the importance of the
two distortions in the labour and product markets, in addition to the full
model shown in column (1) of Table 2, we also present the relevant spe-
cial cases. For example column (2) reports the steady-state results for the
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competitive model.13 This model e¤ectively belongs to the set of models dis-
cussed in Judd (1985) and assumes an inelastic labour supply implying that
ek = ew = e = 1, or that unemployment is zero.14 Column (3) covers the case
when product markets are competitive but labour markets are unionised.15
Following the setup in Guo and Lansing (1999), albeit with inelastic labour
supply, column (4) shows the results for the model when product markets
are monopolistic but labour markets are competitive.16
To understand the e¤ects of introducing union power to the competitive
model and to the prots model, compare respectively the results in columns
(2) with (3) and (4) with (1). It is clear that the labour market distortion
worsens relative outcomes for both agents through higher unemployment,
lower labour income and lower consumption. Hence welfare for both agents
and thus aggregate welfare is lower in the models incorporating unions.
Similarly the e¤ects of allowing for market power in the competitive model
and in the union model can be seen by comparing, respectively, the results
in columns (2) with (4) and (3) with (1). In both cases we can see that
the capitalists welfare has increased but workers and aggregate welfare has
decreased. This nding is driven by higher relative consumption for the
capitalist arising from non-zero economic prots.
4 Distributional e¤ects of tax reforms
We are now in a position to examine the distributional e¤ects of tax reforms
that reduce the tax burden on capital under market distortions in labour
and product markets. In all cases, we nd that the e¤ects of capital tax
reductions are monotonic and increase with the magnitude of the capital tax
cut. Hence, we focus on a policy reform that imposes a zero capital tax
given, as pointed out in the introduction, its prominence in the tax reform
13The results reported in column (2) have been obtained using the parameters in Table
1 except that  and G
u
are not relevant since unemployment is zero,  is equal to unity
and G
t
is re-calibrated so that the steady-state value of w = 0:27 can be achieved.
14The case of inelastic labour supply was also considered by Judd (1985) and is em-
ployed here so that exogenous leisure is treated consistently across the models we employ.
However, note that the results reported below do not change qualitatively when we allow
for endogenous leisure in the perfectly competitive model.
15To obtain the results reported in column (3), we use the parameters from Table 1,
except that  is equal to unity and we re-calibrate G
t
and G
u
, so that the implied model
solutions for w and (1  e) are 0:27 and 0:07 respectively.
16The results reported in column (4) have been obtained using the parameters in Table
1, except that,  and are not relevant since unemployment is zero and Gt is re-calibrated
so that the steady-state value of w = 0:27 can be achieved.
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literature.
We evaluate the e¤ects of the tax reform by comparing the post- with
the pre-reform steady states since we are interested in distributional e¤ects
of capital tax cuts in the long-run.17 In the Tables 3-6 which follow, for
ease of comparison, we repeat the relevant pre-reform results alongside the
post-reform ones. To contextualise the importance of market imperfections,
we rst discuss the results for the benchmark case of competitive markets.
We next analyse the role of unionised labour markets and imperfect product
markets in isolation and then add product market power to the labour market
distortion. Finally, as a robustness exercise, in Tables 7 and 8 respectively,
we examine the quantitative importance of rm and union power.
4.1 The competitive model
The steady-state allocations together with welfare in the competitive model
are shown in Table 3. We also report the welfare gains and losses for capi-
talists and workers, k and k, respectively, together with the welfare gains
at the aggregate level, . These have been calculated as the consumption
supplement required to make the agent as well o¤ in both regimes.18 As can
be seen, in the competitive model, implementation of the tax reform will be
Pareto improving in the long-run, even if it increases inequality. In other
words, there are welfare gains for both type of agents, although the gains for
the capitalists compared to the workers are much higher (i.e. 8:3% versus
1:1%) and thus their relative welfare position improves. This is consistent
with Judds (1985) results that it is optimal for both types of agents to choose
a zero capital tax.
The trade-o¤ for the worker after implementing the zero capital tax can
be seen by noting that, although the labour tax, w, increases (i.e. from 0:27
to 0:324) to make up for the loss in the tax revenue, due to the elimination of
the capital tax, the wage rate, w, rises as well (i.e. from 1:006 to 1:104). This
implies that the net return to labour, ew, also increases (i.e. 0:735 to 0:747)
and thus income, consumption and welfare rise. The reason the wage rate
increases by more than the tax rate is that the elimination of the capital tax
boosts investment and capital, which in turn increases labour productivity
17Note that it is already known that including the transition period will a¤ect the
Pareto superiority of capital tax cuts, even in models where a reduction in the capital tax
is Pareto improving in the long-run (see e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Angelopoulos
et al. (2011b)).
18In particular, they have been obtained using the formula

WA
WB
 1
1 1   1, where WA
and WB is welfare post- and pre-reform, respectively.
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and this is translated into higher wages. Therefore, everyone benets in the
long-run by a reform that implements the zero capital tax.
Table 3: E¤ects of tax-reform in the competitive model
post-reform pre-reform
(1) (2)
C
Y
0.733 0.775
Ik
Y
0.267 0.225
Kk
Y
2.673 2.252
Gt
Y
0.210 0.231
Gu
Y
0.000 0.000

Y
0.000 0.000
G
u
w
0.000 0.000
w 0.324 0.270
(1  e) 0.000 0.000
w 1.104 1.006ew 0.747 0.735
r 0.131 0.155er 0.031 0.031
Ck 1.572 1.451
Cw 1.104 1.092
Uk -21.21 -22.97
Uw -30.20 -30.53
U -27.50 -28.26
k 0.083 
w 0.011 
 0.028 
4.2 Unionised labour markets
The results for the model with distortions in the labour market are shown
in Table 4. Under unionised labour markets, the welfare gains for all agents
are generally lower, compared to those obtained in the competitive model
(see Table 3), and, more importantly, there are now welfare losses for the
workers in the long-run. This occurs since imperfect competition in the
labour market negatively a¤ects the trade-o¤ for the worker that arises with
the implementation of the zero capital tax.
For example, Table 4 shows that the rise in the wage rate (i.e. from 1.006
to 1.104), due to higher productivity, just makes up for the rise in the labour
16
Table 4: E¤ects of tax reform in the union model
post-reform pre-reform
(1) (2)
C
Y
0.733 0.775
Ik
Y
0.267 0.225
Kk
Y
2.673 2.252
Gt
Y
0.187 0.203
Gu
Y
0.030 0.028

Y
0.000 0.000
G
u
w
0.524 0.575
w 0.334 0.270
(1  e) 0.082 0.070
w 1.104 1.006ew 0.735 0.735
r 0.131 0.155er 0.031 0.031
Ck 1.443 1.350
Cw 1.014 1.015
Uk -23.10 -24.70
Uw -32.89 -32.83
U -29.95 -30.39
k 0.069 
w -0.002 
 0.015 
tax rate (i.e. from 0:27 to 0:334), so that the net wage for workers is the
same before and after the zero capital tax reform (i.e. ew = 0:735).
Given the existence of unemployment, the labour tax rate has to increase
by more under imperfect competition to raise the necessary tax revenue after
the loss in capital tax revenue. However, this rise in the labour tax has
an additional side e¤ect which ultimately hurts workers labour income. In
particular, a higher labour tax increases the unemployment rate, (1  e), (i.e.
from 7% to 8:2%), given that, ceteris paribus at the union-rm bargaining
level, it decreases the returns to work and thus makes the outside option
more attractive to the union. At the same time, again at the union-rm
bargaining level, the rise in rms capital stock increases output and this
tends to increase the desire of the rm for a successful outcome of the wage
bargain and thus further enhances the power of the union.19
19Note, given that there is perfect competition in the product market, prices are given
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Since both e¤ects tend to increase unions power, unemployment in-
creases. This in turn implies that the labour income of the worker falls
since the wage rate is higher than the unemployment benet. Therefore, the
distortion in the labour market implies that workers cannot fully benet from
the positive e¤ects created from capital accumulation and overall they are
worse o¤ by a tax reform that eliminates capital and increases labour taxes.
Our results for aggregate welfare are consistent with the long-run welfare
gains to the representative agent in a unionised labour market generated by a
tax reform that cuts capital taxes and increases labour taxes, see e.g. Daveri
and Ma¤ezzoli (2001). The quantitative magnitudes we nd suggest that
such a reform would generate enough gains to compensate the losers. Our
ndings regarding the distributional e¤ects of the tax reform are also consis-
tent with those in Ardagna (2007) who uses a model with monopoly union
power following Ma¤ezzoli (2001). Under perfectly competitive product mar-
kets, Ardagna (2007) includes a rich scal policy menu and government sector
employment to examine exogenous changes in scal instruments accommo-
dated by changes in government debt and nds that workersutility decreases
after increases in labour taxes.
4.3 Monopolistic product markets
The results for the model with distortions in the product markets are shown
in Table 5. These suggest that there are welfare losses for the workers and at
the aggregate level, but big welfare gains for the capitalists. This occurs since
imperfect competition in the product market negatively a¤ects the trade-o¤
for the worker that arises with the implementation of the zero capital tax.
More specically, although the wage rate increases after the elimination
of the capital tax (i.e. from 0:856 to 0:939), due to the usual channel of
increased capital stock and labour productivity, the net wage decreases (i.e.
from 0:625 to 0:57), as the rise in the labour tax (i.e. from 0:27 to 0:393) is
higher than the increase in the wage rate. This implies that labour income
is reduced and the worker is worse-o¤ after the tax reform. This results is
driven by the fact that the loss in tax revenue from capital is bigger under
monopolistic prots, since prots represent an inelastic tax base. In turn,
consistent with the ndings in Guo and Lansing (1999), this implies that the
tax rate on labour has to increase by more to make up for the loss in revenue,
so that the net wage is reduced.
for the rm and thus the increase in output implies a similar increase in revenue. The im-
portance of this will become clearer when we consider the case of monopolistic competition
in product markets below.
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Table 5: E¤ects of tax reform in the prots model
post-reform pre-reform
(1) (2)
C
Y
0.759 0.797
Ik
Y
0.241 0.203
Kk
Y
2.406 2.027
Gt
Y
0.230 0.252
Gu
Y
0.000 0.000

Y
0.100 0.100
G
u
w
0.000 0.000
w 0.393 0.270
(1  e) 0.000 0.000
w 0.939 0.856ew 0.570 0.625
r 0.131 0.155er 0.031 0.031
Ck 1.871 1.571
Cw 0.939 0.993
Uk -17.81 -21.22
Uw -35.52 -33.57
U -30.20 -29.86
k 0.192 
w -0.055 
 -0.011 
4.4 Labour and product market distortions
The post-reform ndings in the model with distortions in both product and
labour market are shown in Table 6. These reveal that the zero capital tax is
Pareto superior to the current tax regime. This transpires since distortions
in the product market work to o¤set the e¤ects of imperfect competition in
the labour market, resulting in a trade-o¤ for the worker implying welfare
gains in the long-run after the capital tax cut.
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Table 6: E¤ects of tax reform in the full model
post-reform pre-reform
(1) (2)
C
Y
0.759 0.797
Ik
Y
0.241 0.203
Kk
Y
2.406 2.027
Gt
Y
0.194 0.227
Gu
Y
0.002 0.024

Y
0.100 0.100
G
u
w
0.455 0.499
w 0.334 0.270
(1  e) 0.006 0.070
w 1.043 0.951ew 0.694 0.694
r 0.146 0.173er 0.046 0.041
Ck 1.861 1.461
Cw 0.933 0.924
Uk -17.92 -22.82
Uw -35.72 -36.09
U -30.38 -32.11
k 0.273 
w 0.010 
 0.057 
Although again, after the tax reform, the net return to labour has re-
mained the same as in the pre-reform economy, unemployment falls from 7%
to 0:6% and, given that the wage rate is higher than the unemployment ben-
et, income, consumption and welfare for the worker increase as well. The
two distortions create two opposing e¤ects on unemployment after the tax
reform. On one hand, the unionisation of the labour market implies that,
as previously, the rise in the labour tax (i.e. from 0:27 to 0:334) decreases
the return to work and thus makes the outside option more attractive to the
union. However, the fall in the capital tax increases capital accumulation,
which increases each individual rms output, i.e. Y f goes up. Given that
nal, per capita output, Y , is taken as given, this increase in individual rms
supply in the monopolistic market implies a fall in its individual price, P f
and tends to decrease the expected revenue of the representative rm. Mo-
nopolistic competition, therefore, tends to reduce the positive revenue e¤ects
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of the increase in output and overall reduces the desire of the rm for a suc-
cessful outcome of the wage bargain. In turn, this implies that the relative
attractiveness of the rms outside option in bargaining has increased, or else
that the rms power relative to the union has increased. The result of these
opposing e¤ects is a rise in employment which is benecial to the worker.
Finally, note that the welfare gains to the capitalist are bigger relative to the
worker, so that, although the elimination of the tax cut is Pareto superior,
welfare inequality has increased.
In general, our ndings for this case are consistent with results from pol-
icy analyses in second-best environments, which suggest that adding more
frictions may lead to improved outcomes, given that one distortion might,
e¤ectively, correct another. Independently, each market failure implies that
capital tax cuts will result in welfare losses for at least one segment of the
population. Together, however, decreases in the capital tax under monopo-
listic competition in the product markets and unionisation in labour markets
are welfare improving for all agents.
4.5 Changes in rm power
Using the full model, we next examine the importance of rm power in the
product market on the welfare gains/losses of a tax reform that eliminates
the capital tax, given a unionised labour market (i.e.  = 0:5). We sum-
marise the results for  between 0:9 and 1. For each case considered, we
report changes for consumption and the unemployment rate from a tax re-
form that eliminates the capital tax relative to the current tax policy as
well as the compensating consumption supplement for each agent and the
aggregate economy.20
Under unionised labour markets, the positive welfare e¤ects for both types
of agents are increased when the extent of monopolistic competition in the
product market increases. In particular, when rm power in the product
market is su¢ ciently high (for our calibration, this occurs for  < 0:98),
there are welfare gains to the worker to be observed after the capital tax cut.
As can be seen, the e¤ect of the tax reform on the labour market is positive
in these cases, in the sense that employment is increased. This is because
the monopolistic e¤ect on rms revenue is strong enough to outweigh, in the
wage bargaining problem, the negative e¤ects of increased labour taxes in
20Not that for all cases considered, the spending shares are re-calibrated so that the base
in all cases is an economy with 7% unemployment and 27% labour tax rate. Otherwise,
the parameters used are as in Table 1. Also note that the results in Tables 7 and 8 for
consumption are in percent di¤erences, whereas the unemployment rate is in percentage
point di¤erences.
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the trade-o¤ between the two market distortions discussed above.
Table 7: Firm power () in the product market
(changes relative to current policy)
0.900 0.950 0.980 0.990 1.000
Ck 0.400 0.240 0.150 0.122 0.093
Cw 0.009 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(1  e) -0.064 -0.024 -0.002 0.005 0.012
k 0.273 0.170 0.109 0.090 0.069
w 0.010 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
 0.057 0.038 0.024 0.020 0.015
4.6 Changes in union power
We next examine the importance of union power in the labour markets on the
welfare gains of a tax reform the eliminates the capital tax, for given rms
power in the product market (i.e.  = 0:9). The parameter that measures the
relative power of unions vis-a-vis the rm in Nash-bargaining for the wage
rate is . As discussed earlier, our base calibration above is based on a value
for  that is e¤ectively in the middle of the range of the empirically relevant
values. In what follows, we examine changes in  that encompass the entire
range used in the literature, (see e.g. Domeij (2005)). As in Table 7, for each
case considered, the results are reported as changes from a tax reform that
eliminates the capital tax relative to the current tax policy.
The results in Table 8 suggest that the welfare gains for all agents from
a tax reform are increasing in . As  increases, the unemployment benet
needs to fall in the pre-reform economy so that the new calibration implies the
same labour tax and unemployment rate as in the base case.21 This suggests
that the relative power of the union in the labour market derives more from
the institutional features associated with  and less from the outside option
or else, that G
u
has a smaller e¤ect on determining unemployment. As
discussed above, after the capital tax cut and the concurrent increase in
labour tax, the negative e¤ect on unemployment takes place via the increase
in the labour tax relative to the unemployment benet, as they determine
the relative weight of the outside option for unions. Therefore, given that
the importance of this outside option has been reduced for a combination of
21As before, the spending shares are re-calibrated so that the base in all cases is an
economy with 7% unemployment and 27% labour tax rate. Otherwise, the parameters
used are as in Table 1.
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higher  and lower G
u
, the e¤ect of the increase in the labour tax relative to
G
u
after the tax reform exerts a smaller negative e¤ect on unemployment.
Table 8: Union power () in the labour market
(changes relative to current policy)
0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625 0.750
Ck 0.392 0.396 0.400 0.403 0.406
Cw 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.013
(1  e) -0.060 -0.062 -0.064 -0.066 -0.068
k 0.268 0.271 0.273 0.276 0.278
w 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.014
 0.052 0.055 0.057 0.059 0.060
5 Conclusions
This paper examined the long-run welfare e¤ects of tax reforms under hetero-
geneneity in capital holdings assuming imperfect competition in product and
labour markets. Given the relevance of these market failures, our analysis can
help to inform current policy discussions regarding the potential impacts of
capital tax reforms. Using a calibrated model whose steady-state reproduced
the main features of the UK economy, our main ndings are as follows.
First, in the presence of the labour market distortion only, a tax reform
that implements a zero capital tax implies welfare losses for the workers,
whereas capitalistsand aggregate welfare increases. We nd that the un-
employment channel is the critical link that modies the results from the
benchmark model with competitive labour markets. In particular, although
labour productivity and the after-tax wage increase, the workers cannot cap-
ture the full benet of this as unemployment also increases.
Second, under competitive labour markets but non-competitive product
markets, a zero capital tax leads to welfare gains for the capitalists and losses
for the workers as well as the aggregate economy. This occurs since, the gov-
ernment has to forego revenue from a non-distortionary tax base comprised
of "pure prots" so that the required increase in the labour tax is larger and
thus the net wage falls after the tax reform.
Finally, monopolistic competition in the product market, under unionised
labour markets, introduces a market failure that works to correct the neg-
ative implications of imperfect labour markets. In particular, monopolistic
competition tends to reduce the positive revenue e¤ects of the increase in
output after a capital tax cut and thus reduce the benets to the rm for a
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successful outcome of wage bargaining. In turn, this implies that the rela-
tive attractiveness of the rms outside option in bargaining and its power
relative to the union increases. This tends to increase employment and the
benets to all agents after a tax cut.
Given that most modern economies are characterised by imperfect com-
petition in both product and labour markets, we would consider the nal
set of results to be potentially the most useful. However, the above analysis
also makes clear that combining market failures that, independently, have
similar welfare e¤ects, does not necessarily lead to total e¤ects which work
in the same direction. Instead, the welfare implications can be completely
reversed. Thus, our results also imply that omission of relevant market and
policy failures may bias the results in ways that cannot always be predicted
ex ante.
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